96 HUMANISM vi 



current philosophy towards it is so obscure, that no 

 apology is needed for a further discussion of his results. 

 That those results came upon me with the shock of 

 novelty I cannot, indeed, pretend ; for the impossibility 

 of reconciling the truth of the Dialectic with the reality 

 of the Time-process has long been familiar to me as the 

 chief, and, to me, insuperable difficulty of the Hegelian 

 position. I propose, therefore, to take for granted the 

 reluctant conclusion of Dr. McTaggart s almost scholastic 

 ingenuity, namely, that there is no known way of 

 reconciling the (admitted) existence of the Time-process 

 with the (alleged) eternal perfection of the Absolute 

 Idea at all events until some other commentator of 

 Hegelism has attempted to revise and refute Dr. 

 McTaggart s arguments and I wish to consider what 

 inferences may be drawn from it with respect to the 

 method of metaphysical speculation in general. 



Before doing so, however, a word ought, perhaps, to be 

 said on what Dr. McTaggart himself inclines to regard 

 as the positive result of his inquiry, the fact namely that 

 he has not been able to show that there is no possible 

 synthesis of the Absolute Idea with the Time-process, 

 and that he is consequently &quot;entitled to believe that one 

 more synthesis remains as yet unknown, which shall 

 overcome the last and most persistent of the contradictions 

 inherent in appearance.&quot; For faint as is the hope which 

 nourishes this belief, and groundless as are the assumptions 

 from which that hope may, I think, be shown to spring, 

 one may yet congratulate Dr. McTaggart on the candour 

 with which he distinguishes his faith in the Unknown 

 Synthesis from the cogency of a logical demonstration, 

 and on the diffidence with which he declines to avail 

 himself of the easy convenience of Mr. Bradley s maxim 

 that &quot; what may be, and must be, that certainly is.&quot; 

 For certainly, if one does not scruple to regard utter 

 ignorance as the possibility that may be, and the 

 subjective need of saving one s own theory as the 

 necessity that must be, there is no difficulty which 

 cannot be evaded by the application of that maxim and 



