vi METAPHYSICS OF TIME-PROCESS 97 



no contradiction which cannot be so reconciled. My 

 only fear would be that if such an axiom were admitted 

 at the beginning of philosophy, it would also prove its 

 end. Dr. McTaggart, however, is to be congratulated on 

 having eschewed the dangers of Mr. Bradley s short way 

 with the insoluble, and on preferring to base his accept 

 ance of conflicting views on the ancient, time-honoured 

 and extra-logical principle of Faith. Still more admir 

 able, perhaps, is the robustness of a faith which overlooks 

 the curious inconsistency of denying the metaphysical 

 value of Time, and yet expecting from the Future the 

 discovery of the ultimate synthesis on which one s whole 

 metaphysic depends. For myself I avow that such faith 

 is beyond my reach. If I were driven to the conclusion 

 that the inexorable necessities of my mental constitution 

 directly conflicted with patent and undeniable facts of 

 experience, I fear I should be beset by a sceptical distrust 

 of the ultimate rationality of all things rather than solaced 

 by visions of an unknown synthesis. 



But in this case I hope to show that there is no 

 need to respect a faith one cannot share, and that Dr. 

 McTaggart has given more to faith than faith demands. 



If the contradiction cannot be solved, it can at least 

 be exposed and explained. And unless I am very much 

 mistaken, it will appear that the incompatibility between 

 the assertion of the reality of the Time-process and its 

 comprehension by any system of eternal logical truth 

 (whether Hegel s or any one else s) has its origin in very 

 simple and obvious considerations. 



Dr. McTaggart cannot find room for the reality of 

 the Time-process, i.e. of the world s changes in time and 

 space, within the limits of Hegel s Dialectic. But is 

 this an exclusive peculiarity or difficulty of Hegel s 

 position ? Is the Time-process any more intelligible on 

 the assumptions of any other purely logical l system, as, 

 for instance, on those of Plato or Spinoza ? I think 

 the difficulty will be found to recur in all these systems. 

 And this shows that it is not accidental, but intrinsic 



1 I.e. intellectualist. 



H 



