vi METAPHYSICS OF TIME-PROCESS 109 



physic becomes indebted to it for the means to solve its 

 difficulties. Is it not curious then to go on maintaining 

 that the Time-process is unfit to form a factor in an ulti 

 mate philosophy ? 



An evolutionist philosophy, on the other hand, would 

 not only be entitled, but bound, to await a solution of its 

 difficulties from the secular development of the Time- 

 process which had generated them. For its ultimate 

 appeal is not to the abstract reason but to experience, to 

 the Time-process in which that reason develops. It is 

 consequently an ignoratio elenchi to infer that a view lead 

 ing to an antimony is false, unless it can be shown that 

 the antinomy is a permanent one. But not only is this 

 impossible, but a solution ambulando may be expected on 

 two grounds, (i) Reality, i.e. the data of our reasonings, 

 may so change as no longer to suggest the antinomy. 

 For instance, the problem of imperfection would vanish if 

 reality attained to perfection and not even a memory 

 remained of the imperfect. And (2) the antinomy might 

 be resolved by such a development of the mind as would 

 enable it to see through its present difficulties. I am 

 aware that many of our present philosophers have a rooted 

 objection to putting their hope in the future ; yet it is 

 only in the direction of an abandonment of the prejudice 

 against the reality of Time that I can descry a future for 

 hope, a future for philosophy, and a philosophy for the 

 future. 



