2i 4 HUMANISM xn 



existence should be interpreted. I shall consider the 

 conceptions of Motion, Life, and Consciousness in turn. 



(a) It has long been admitted that Motion tends to 

 equilibrium, and that in a perfect equilibrium there would 

 be no (perceptible) motion and no available energy. 



Under the name of the dissipation of energy this fact 

 of its equilibration has become notorious. It is the great 

 bugbear of physics which has given rise to the gloomiest 

 vaticinations concerning the inevitable decadence and 

 ultimate doom of the universe. 1 



This whole difficulty arises out of our habit of con 

 templating equilibration as cessation of Motion or Rest. 

 An equilibrated universe cannot change and its latent 

 energy cannot be used to change it. Ergo such a universe 

 is played out. 



But why should we not regard this situation as a case 

 of ^vepjeia Atciwrja-ias, as a perfecting of Motion until it 

 has everywhere become perfectly regular, steady, smooth 

 and frictionless ? Logically, in fact, this seems a far 

 preferable alternative. 



&quot;Suppose, e.g. an equilibrium of temperature. If two 

 bodies are at equal temperatures, does that mean that 

 they have ceased to have temperature? Have they 

 ceased to radiate out heat, or (to put it in terms of the 

 current theory about heat) to exhibit the molecular 



1 Strictly the degradation or dissipation of energy is said to apply only to 

 finite portions of the universe, and consolation is sometimes sought in the thought 

 that the universe is possibly infinite, and that in an infinite anything may happen. 

 Now it is true that the doctrine of the dissipation of energy ceases to apply to an 

 infinite universe, but the reason is merely that in view of an actual infinity, all 

 propositions become unmeaning. And an infinite universe or whole involves a 

 contradiction in terms, and is a pseudo-conception which can be reached only by 

 a confusion of thought. (Cp. Riddles of the Sphinx, ch. ix. 2-9.-) Emotionally 

 too the worthy people who regard infinity as something delightful and magnificent 

 seem to have not the faintest notion of what an infinite universe would really be like. 

 What it means is that in no conceivable way, from no conceivable point of view, 

 would it exhibit any finality or security of any kind. It would be what Prof. 

 James calls a nulliverse, an indefinite plurality of things, which could never be 

 got together into a unity, an amorphous heap whose conduct would be utterly 

 incalculable. 



