xin HUMISM AND HUMANISM 229 



form of Humism. As in all such cases, there is some 

 logical foundation, as well as much psychological excuse, 

 for the attempt to apperceive the new in terms of the old. 

 It contains some truth, and is partly right. But it is also 

 largely wrong. 



To consider this classification in its former aspect 

 first ; it is obvious that Humism and Humanism are both 

 empiricisms of a pronounced type, and that this constitutes 

 an important resemblance between them. Again, there 

 seems at any rate to be a certain likeness in their attitude 

 towards the metaphysics of the period. The fascinating 

 style and the more than Socratic irony of Hume do indeed 

 render it difficult to determine the exact motives of his 

 philosophizing. But we shall not, probably, go far wrong, 

 if we suppose that his opposition to dogmatism, alike 

 whether it took the form of religious bigotry or of 

 philosophic narrow-mindedness, gave zest to his interest 

 in philosophy. Hume seems to take an impish delight in 

 upsetting religious and philosophic orthodoxies, and his 

 own doctrines seem rather to be selected with this purpose 

 than held with any absolute assurance of their intrinsic 

 worth. Hume is quite willing to admit their defects : 

 after they have served their purpose and done their 

 emancipating work, he is quite ready to disavow his 

 instruments and to affect an attitude of gentlemanly 

 unconcern about the abstruse inanities of theologians and 

 metaphysicians. This temper, indeed, would appear to be 

 the essence of his scepticism. Psychologically regarded, 

 it does not lie in his doctrine, but in his attitude towards 

 theoretic difficulties. 



Now, superficially regarded, the Humanist attitude 

 may seem quite similar. It is somewhat lacking in 

 that reverence for academic dogmas, technicalities and 

 shibboleths, which it is often supposed to be desirable 

 and possible to inculcate into the young. It is certainly 

 critical of very deep-rooted assumptions which have 

 hitherto passed current without challenge. It is singu 

 larly modest in the claims it makes for its own principles. 

 It makes no attempt to represent them as absolute 



