232 HUMANISM 



XIII 



have destroyed the old antithesis between empiricism 

 and apriorism by rendering both terms ambiguous, and 

 propounding a middle way which forms a third alternative 

 to the epistemological dilemma. Of the dogma all know 

 ledge comes from experience it inquires, aye, but from 

 a passive experience or an active ? Of the dogma all 

 knowledge implies an a priori] it inquires but how a 

 priori^ Is it prior as a mere fact of our (present) mental 

 constitution, and so powerless to guarantee its own future 

 continuance, or as an intelligent act of faith ? Clearly, 

 then, a voluntarist a priori, adopted upon the bare sug 

 gestion of experience for its methodological value, and 

 established by its continued working, does not fit into the 

 old classification at all. 



(2) Humanism does not accept Hume s criticism of 

 causation and his denial of activity, as all intellectualisms 

 are (more or less unwillingly) compelled to do. (3) It 

 is not naturalistic ; because it regards the mechanical 

 conception of nature as itself a construction for human 

 purposes, which is valuable and valid because, and in so 

 far as, it subserves these purposes. (4) It is not deter 

 ministic, as rationalisms are logically bound to be, but 

 libertarian. 



Thus it agrees with Hume only (i) in the belief that 

 the course of events has something to teach us, and brings 

 real enlightenment, because it cannot be predicted with 

 absolute certainty, i.e. in a common empiricism ; it agrees 



(2) that no apriorism can ever give the guarantee it aims 

 at, and assure us of the future, because any necessity of 

 thought may change if human nature changes ; it agrees 



(3) in a common pragmatism, i.e. in their agreement that 

 practical efficiency of a conception is relevant to its truth, 

 and may be pleaded in answer to apparent theoretical 

 defects. But even here the differences are very marked. 

 Hume s pragmatism hardly seems to be sincere ; it is 

 always suspiciously suggestive of a blind to disguise his 

 scepticism. Again, Hume s appeal to the pragmatic 

 principle is quite arbitrary and capricious : he uses it to 

 save the face of common sense and (perhaps) of science, 



