xin HUMISM AND HUMANISM 237 



knowledge of causal efficacy must be prior to experience : 

 &quot; were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by 

 the mind, we could foresee the effect even without ex 

 perience.&quot; * 



(3) He argues specifically that the feeling of power 

 which accompanies voluntary motion is illusory, because 

 (a) the union of soul and body and the operation of the 

 one on the other is avowedly a mystery ; because ($) 

 voluntary control varies greatly with the various organs. 

 Why, on this theory, &quot; has the will an influence over the 

 tongue and fingers and not over the heart or liver ? &quot; 

 Again, a man suddenly paralysed is as conscious as ever 

 of a power to command his limbs, though the usual 

 motions no longer ensue. As, however, consciousness 

 never deceives (a comically scholastic maxim !) it never 

 really testifies to any real power. &quot; We learn the in 

 fluence of our will from experience alone.&quot; (c) Volitions 

 are not the immediate antecedents of voluntary motions. 

 There are a number of intermediary processes in the 

 brain and the nerves and the muscles, of which we 

 are not conscious. Ergo, the original power felt, the 

 sentiment or impression or sensation of m sus, or 

 endeavour, is no proof of a power to move the limbs. 



Hume proceeds to argue similarly that neither the 

 felt effort in overcoming the resistance of bodies, nor the 

 voluntary control of our conscious states, can have given 

 rise to the idea of power ; but the latter of these need 

 not be considered by us, as primitive reasoners cannot 

 certainly be credited with introspectiveness enough to 

 have observed it. 



IV 



The extreme brilliance of this argument is undeniable, 

 but this hardly explains the acceptance it has won from 

 philosophers of all schools, as different as Reid, Hamilton, 



1 Ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 63; cp. also p. 78, note: &quot;These sensations&quot; (of 

 effort) &quot;which are merely animal, and from which we can a priori draw no 

 inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects.&quot; 



