xin HUMISM AND HUMANISM 239 



the volitional theory of causation. Hume argues, very 

 plausibly, that the theory is not valid, and infers that it 

 could not have served as the prototype of our causal 

 notions. But this is clearly an ignoratio elencki. Obviously 

 it is no answer to an account of the origination of a belief 

 to show that the belief arrived at is wrong. Still less is it 

 this to show that a further belief derived from this erroneous 

 belief is also wrong. For our truest and most valuable 

 beliefs have frequently originated in what are now despised 

 as childish errors. The confusion grows worse when we 

 observe that Hume professedly was not inquiring into the 

 validity but into the origin of the belief in causal efficacy. 

 His explanation thereof rested on the psychological im 

 possibility of suggesting any other source for it but uni 

 formity plus expectation ; not on the logical defects of 

 the proposed alternatives. Hence he involves himself in 

 verbal contradictions which are almost comical. On the 

 same page he declares x both that &quot; every idea is copied 

 from some preceding impression or sentiment, . . . there 

 is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently 

 can suggest any idea of power &quot; and also that we have a 

 &quot; sentiment of a nisus or endeavour &quot; and &quot;feel a customary 

 connexion between ideas &quot; and transfer these &quot; feelings &quot; 



o 



(or &quot; sensations &quot;) to objects. 



Whether, therefore, the volitional theory be right or 

 not, Hume s case, as presented by himself, is fatally 

 damaged by the mere suggestion that the immediate 

 experience of voluntary motion was the source whence 

 men first derived their notion of causal efficacy. That 

 historically this was the origin of the belief is nowadays 

 beyond doubt, nor does Hume really deny it. Men and 

 the higher animals all begin their intellectual careers as 

 animists, and animism means that all motion is interpreted 

 on the analogy of voluntary agency, which is a familiar 

 experience to us all long before it is analysed, reflected 

 on or explained away. If, however, Hume had explicitly 

 admitted this as the historical origin of the idea of 

 causation, he would have found himself compelled to face 



1 Ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 78. 



