XIV 



SOLIPSISM 1 



ARGUMENT 



The argument from action to belief proves the sincerity of Humanist dis 

 claimers of solipsism. But there are transitions to solipsism from (i) 

 absolute, (2) subjective idealism, (3) Aristotelianism, (4) most modern 

 philosophies, even (5) the New Realisms. These become crypto- 

 solipsistic, becauset hey ignore the processes by which the knower arrives 

 at objects and compares them with his former objects and those of 

 others, and overlook the selectiveness of thought and the existence of 

 error. (6) The interdependence of subject and object also leads to 

 solipsism. 



The Humanist rejection of solipsism and its pragmatic confirmation. 

 It is not theoretically cogent, but the appeal of solipsism to the analogy 

 of dream life is false. The dreamer and the maker of dreams. The 

 pragmatic refutation of all practicable solipsism. 



&quot; SOLIPSISM is the most detestable form of wickedness 

 that ever entered into the mind of a philosopher.&quot; This 

 pronouncement, the solipsissima verba of an intelligent 

 undergraduate, once occurred in an Oxford examination 

 paper. It should afford philosophers much food for 

 reflection. At first sight it seems to evince only an in 

 sufficient apprehension of the philosophic mind s capacity 

 for crime. There is a not ignoble apologia for the 

 Speculative Life in the suggestion that if philosophers 

 were not allowed to indulge in it they might be com 

 mitting murders instead of paralogisms. Even so the 



1 When one considers what an appalling amount of time and energy is 

 annually consumed in Examinations, and how little any of the parties to them 

 have to show for it, it is surprising that they are so rarely utilized for the purpose 

 of gauging the trend of current thought upon the subjects examined on. That 

 they can be made to afford instruction to others than the examiners will, I 

 hope, be a conclusion distinctly suggested by the present article, which is largely 

 inspired by the answers to a question set in 1908 in the Oxford School of Literae 

 Hiimaniores, and is reprinted from Mind, No. 70. 



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