250 HUMANISM xiv 



Philosopher- Villain has been, as Plato himself has testi 

 fied, 1 a good deal commoner than the Philosopher-King. 

 Possibly however the writer was desirous only of 

 complimenting his tutor (who was one .of the examiners) 

 and of taking an optimistic view of his character. But 

 supposing him to have been sincere, why should he have 

 regarded so practically innocuous a thing as Solipsism as 

 an offence, and have classified it as a form of wicked 

 ness, however mild ? And what did he mean by 

 Solipsism ? 



These questions are worthy of investigation, and I 

 feel myself peculiarly fitted for the task. For though 

 not myself a solipsist, I have been repeatedly mistaken 

 for one. I may be presumed therefore to hold views 

 sufficiently akin to Solipsism to appreciate it fairly, and 

 yet to be interested in distinguishing myself from it. 



Inherently of course Solipsism is an absurd predicate 

 to fasten on to a Humanist philosophy. Humanism is 

 essentially social, and therefore pluralistic. But for this 

 very reason it cannot treat the problem of Solipsism with 

 that curious mixture of hauteur and frivolity to which 

 monistic philosophies are driven. It may honestly admit 

 and sympathetically examine the case for Solipsism, and 

 gather therefrom much instruction about the processes by 

 which individual valuations acquire social currency. A 

 monistic philosophy on the other hand is always haunted 

 by the dread that if the One which alone truly is should 

 turn out to be in any real sense spiritual, it may be 

 . driven to admit that Solipsism is the ultimate truth. It 

 is tempted, therefore, to hedge, and to obscure its logical 

 implications, and to fix a gulf between the theoretic 

 meaning of its principles and its practical consequences. 



A Humanist can afford to be more candid because 

 no logical necessity impels him. He is quite free in the 

 matter. If he wanted to be a solipsist he could be. If 

 he were, he need not hesitate to say so. He would be 

 afraid of no one, for he would see that there was no one 

 to be afraid of. But if he did not want to be a solipsist, 



1 Republic, 487 D. 



