xiv SOLIPSISM 251 



and denied that he was, this assurance should suffice, 

 because it would yield a trustworthy guarantee. And if 

 it could be observed that in his actions he did not ignore 

 the existence of- others, but recognized them as beings 

 with thoughts, wills and tempers of their own, for which 

 he was both unable and unwilling to undertake the 

 responsibility, the guarantee would be complete. 



For it is a unique peculiarity of a Humanist s philo- \ 

 sophy that in it it is possible to argue back from a 

 behaviour to the belief that underlies it. He holds that 

 the reality of a belief depends on, and is tested by, its 

 applicability. His beliefs therefore must be acted on, and 

 he cannot afford the luxury of theoretic beliefs, which 

 cannot be acted on in practice. If he acts on a belief, 

 he must hold it true ; if he does not act on it, he 

 does not truly believe it. In all other philosophies the 

 highest truths may be unpractical and inapplicable to 

 life, while the beliefs implied in action may be secretly 

 despised as practical makeshifts. Hence arise endless 

 possibilities of nonsense, ambiguity and misconstruction, 

 not to say disingenuousness. For if what is believed 

 to be the highest truth should be nonsensical verbiage, 

 it cannot be detected by the test of practice, which can 

 eliminate only errors that are acted on. Errors that 

 remain purely theoretical cannot be got rid of, because 

 they cannot be tested in the only final way. It cannot, 

 therefore, be inferred that if such a philosopher behaves 

 as if his fellow-men were other than himself, or he himself 

 were other than God, he really believes this. He may 

 only be pretending, or finding it necessary to convey a 

 false impression for practical purposes, because in his 

 philosophy there is no necessary connexion between 

 theory and practice. Now in practice no one actually 

 behaves as if he not only owned the world, but also 

 was the world ; but whereas in the humanist s case 

 it is possible to infer from his actions that he does 

 not believe that he is the world, in the case of other 

 philosophers it is not. Humanism, therefore, may safely 

 be believed when it disavows Solipsism ; other philosophies 



