xiv SOLIPSISM 255 



conscious that he is not infallible, but is frequently forced 

 to correct his first perceptions by subsequent experiences. 

 His trust in the perception of the moment blinds him to 

 the need of withholding his assent from his objects, of 

 recognizing how his ideas pervade them, and of amend 

 ing both by long and painful testing. He falls a prey 

 to the intuitions of the moment, and never inquires how 

 true intuitions are discriminated from false. 



(2) In consequence of never comparing his perceptions 

 at different times with each other, he never asks himself 

 how his perceptions accord with those of others. Hence 

 he fails to notice the social and human character of truth, 

 and to discover that the most imperative reason for 

 assuming the existence of subjective ideas lies in the 

 necessity of a social compromise. When A and B perceive 

 reality differently, it is easier, humaner and better to 

 ascribe to both an idea of reality than to assert the 

 unreality of one of these perceptions and to leave them to 

 fight out which one it is. Reality is thus cleared of a 

 contradiction which can be treated as merely subjective. 

 New Realism on the other hand, after ruling out the 

 problems of intersubjective adjustment as psychological 

 irrelevance, unwittingly bases its analysis on the single 

 case of a knower knowing his world, without regard to 

 the worlds of others. And this procedure is naturally 

 and essentially solipsistic. 



(3) Even this case of a single mind at a given moment 

 it cannot analyse effectively for lack of psychological 

 interest. Hence it fails to perceive the all-pervading 

 selectiveness of all thought, and to reflect on the important 

 fact that whatever is perceived has been conditioned by 

 the direction of attention upon it, and preferred to some 

 thing else that might have been perceived if the attention 

 had been directed otherwise. About the totality of reality 

 an infinity of truths may be enunciated or perceived ; 

 hence the one which is enunciated or perceived is necessarily 

 the outcome of an enormous amount of selection. And 

 it is obvious that the ground of this selection cannot 

 lie in the reality as such, but must proceed from the 



