xiv SOLIPSISM 257 



and nothing can divorce them. By thus shutting out 

 ideas it hopes to leave no loophole for the demon of 

 subjectivity to enter in. 



The theory has its difficulties, doubtless, especially 

 when asked to explain the nature of error, but on the 

 whole it is very reminiscent of Aristotle and seems very 

 sensible. It reproduces, almost completely, the view 

 of reality initially taken by an unsophisticated human 

 mind. 



And yet its weak point lies just here. It is good for 

 a human mind. But not for more. So soon as the 

 problem is complicated by the introduction of a second 

 mind, its solution ceases to satisfy. For the second 

 mind also perceives reality quite as spontaneously, con 

 fidently, intuitively. Only it does not perceive quite 

 like the first Each naturally maintains that it perceives 

 rightly, and the other wrongly. The result is a row. To 

 allay this disturbance, and to render social life possible, 

 therefore, a compromise has to be affected between the 

 conflicting claims of divergent minds. Common sense 

 rules that to avoid quarrels neither shall be deemed to 

 be in direct contact with the object as it really is. For 

 if both had an immediate and inerrant apprehension of 

 what is, the actual divergence between its results would 

 plainly be impossible. But both are supposed to recognize 

 one and the same object in their own subjective way. 

 The common world of reality is variously reflected in 

 the various individuals that cognize it. Thus to avoid 

 greater evils a subjective factor is introduced into all 

 knowing ; the ideas of various minds are interpolated 

 between the mind and the realities it tries to know, but 

 can never apprehend immediately. All perception of 

 reality thus becomes representative, and is subject to 

 subjective distortion, and how far this may go can never 

 be determined a priori. 



Hinc illae lacrimae ; hence the long agony of the theory 

 of knowledge, from Descartes to Kant and from Kant to 

 Humanism. For the whole problem of what it means for 

 two minds to know the same thing, and of how it can be 



s 



