xiv SOLIPSISM 259 



ness of his perceptions. In words perhaps this position 

 may be thought to fall short of Solipsism, because there 

 are still realities for him to perceive. But he has 

 become the autocratic judge of this whole reality ; and 

 this is in substance Solipsism. He is the only mind in the 

 world, of which he is the sole experient. Oto? 



($) The second type of New Realism seems less 

 extreme, and one might prognosticate for it a longer life. 

 It makes attempts to account for the existence and correc 

 tion of error, and for the growth and improvement of 

 knowledge. To do so it has to admit the presence of 

 a subjective contribution in our perceptions of reality ; 

 but it regards this as the source only of error and 

 opinion. Between opinion and knowledge it fixes 

 a great gulf, like Plato in the Republic. Knowledge is 

 of the object, and though it involves a relation of the 

 mind, it must not be supposed to alter the nature of its 

 terms. Hence the object in the cognitive relation is just 

 as it was (or would be) in itself, and nothing about it is 

 dependent on the mind s knowing it. This last corollary 

 is of course somewhat difficult to defend, when it 

 is questioned. So is the gulf between opinion and 

 Knowledge. It might prove hard to adduce an un 

 equivocal example of Knowledge/ and to show that 

 what is so called is ever more than opinion, and, of 

 course, if no Knowledge can be found, its total effect is 

 sceptical. Again the theory is hard put to it to assign 

 a tolerable position to a good many facts, e.g. those of 

 colour-perception. 



But it is when confronted with the facts of error and 

 difference of opinion that this New Realism most clearly 

 seems to falter. When A and B both claim to apprehend 

 reality, but differ irreconcilably as to what reality is, it is 

 at a loss to decide which of them is right. And yet the 

 need for such decisions cannot lightly be denied. For 

 such differences are deep-seated and persistent. Two 

 men may even agree entirely as to the facts, so far as 



1 Odyssey, x. 495. 



