xiv SOLIPSISM 263 



after our kind ; and between the two there is no real 

 connexion. The Subject, doubtless, may continue to 

 perceive the changeless world which forms its Object 

 throughout all the mischances of our mortal life ; but we 

 never perceived that world, and to our questions about 

 the relation of our world to our minds we get no answer. 

 The whole doctrine has thus become an irrelevant 

 speculation concerning a Subject and an Object about 

 which we only know that they are not human, nor 

 humanly knowable ; it leaves unexplained and un 

 intelligible the position of the pseudo - subjects and 

 pseudo-objects which surround us. 



Once more the only way of really making the theory 

 mean anything and of really correlating subject and 

 object is to construe it solipsistically. The consistent 

 idealist must hold that since with the Subject there would 

 pass away the Object, it is only if, and so long as, he is a 

 subject that a world of objects can endure. 



It is possible that by this time the force of the argu 

 ment may be producing an impression that for company s 

 sake every philosopher, who cannot bear to stand alone 

 and to lead the /3ib&amp;lt;? ^ovwr^, had better own to 

 Solipsism. But such intimidation will not daunt the 

 Humanist nor cause him to desist from his endeavour (i) 

 to refute Solipsism and (2) to solve the solipsistic puzzle. 



(i) The Humanist s refutation of Solipsism is simple 

 and sufficient. He is not a solipsist, because he chooses 

 to believe in the existence of others. He believes this 

 not so much for the sentimental reason that he does not 

 want to be alone in the universe, but because he does not 

 want to regard himself as the author of his whole experi 

 ence. He will not take the responsibility of being all 

 there is in a world such as is now provided. He does 

 not desire to be any or all of the other minds, nor the 

 totality of reality. He sees that he cannot be the 

 Absolute without being also the Devil (and an insane 

 Devil at that !), and so he prefers to be neither Absolute 

 nor Devil. 



