264 HUMANISM X iv 



Now this position seems eminently reasonable, but if 

 any one declines to accept it, the Humanist cannot compel 

 dissentients to adopt it. He cannot compel them not to 

 be solipsists, if they prefer to regard him and everything 

 else as just creatures of their disordered imaginations ; 

 nor does it follow from the nature of his theory that he 

 should have this power. Whereas to a solipsist it must 

 appear extremely puzzling, as well as annoying, that he 

 should not be able to avoid contradiction and resistance 

 at the hands of what ex hypotliesi are his own creatures. 



The Humanist refutation of Solipsism, then, begins 

 frankly with a postulate. Into the origin of this postulate 

 it is no more necessary to inquire here than in other cases. 

 For it seems unmeaning to discuss the antecedent reason 

 ableness of a thing not yet in existence. The human 

 reason must have something to reflect on before it can 

 discuss the value of anything. A postulate, therefore, 

 has to be made before it can be justified. The origin, 

 therefore, of our fundamental postulates can only be 

 deduced in a mythical form. But we are not really 

 concerned with it. Whether it was an inspiration or a 

 random guess, the postulate that there are others has 

 come into existence. Once made, it has of course been 

 tested by its working. And it will hardly be disputed 

 that it has worked very well. It is therefore accounted 

 reasonable and true by the generality of mankind, who 

 are not philosophers. And a Humanist philosopher at 

 any rate is not easily persuaded that in so vital a point 

 the experience of mankind is wrong. He will therefore 

 claim the right to hold the postulate true, because, and so 

 long as, it works. 



It will be noticed that the refutation of Solipsism by 

 the success of this postulate is thoroughly pragmatic. It 

 is neither a priori nor absolute. It does not rest on 

 presuppositions about the possibilities of all experience. 

 It does not profess to show that Solipsism is unthinkable. 

 It is willing to allow that Solipsists may exist, and even 

 flourish. It is willing to listen to what they have to say 

 for themselves. It makes no higher claim for its own 



