266 HUMANISM 



XIV 



In other words his Solipsism would have to be empirical^ 

 and not a priori, precisely as is our ordinary solipsistic 

 interpretation of dreams. 



A Solipsism so conceived would seem to be harmless. 

 It would make no practical difference. Our solipsist 

 would have to recognize in the persons and objects of his 

 dream quite as much independence and ability to 

 resist the control of his will as the most benighted 

 pluralist. He would have to treat them as other than 

 his dreaming self. We all usually pay this amount of 

 respect to the creatures of our dreams. If the solipsistic 

 theory of their nature is to be retained, it is on condition 

 that it remains a mere theory which is not allowed to 

 affect conduct. Should it be allowed to do so, it would 

 of course spell disaster, and would refute itself in the one 

 really final way, viz. by the elimination of its holder. 



Nevertheless it is a point deserving of consideration 

 whether theoretic exception should not be taken to an 

 assumption which Solipsism shares with Common Sense. 

 Both assume it as self-evident that the solipsistic inter 

 pretation of dream life is valid, i.e. that the self that has 

 the dream is identical with the self that makes the dream. 

 This, however, may be disputed. The dreamer is the 

 victim, and not the maker, of the dream which surprises 

 and torments him. Hence every dreamer, and every 

 solipsist, is not really one but two. The strange possi 

 bilities of such an inherent duality in the self are 

 vividly illustrated by the famous Beauchamp case so 

 graphically recorded by Dr. Morton Prince, 1 in which, 

 apparently, the maker of dreams obtained control of 

 the body. If then after the fashion of Miss Beauchamp 

 every solipsist is accompanied by his Sally, it might 

 become a subtle question whether the dreamer or the 

 maker of dreams was really entitled to be a solipsist, and 

 how sincerely the former could really take a solipsistic view 

 of his complex personality. But it will probably be vain 

 to raise this point ; metaphysicians have always been too 

 neglectful of ordinary people s dreams to be critical of 



1 The Dissociation of a Personality (1906). 



