xvi FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 287 



the rejection of Determinism. But, of course, it is one 

 thing to exhibit the practical importance and necessity of 

 Freedom and another to establish its theoretical validity 

 as a philosophic interpretation of the facts of life, and in 

 this larger undertaking we shall have to encounter the 

 arguments of many of the philosophers of the past and 

 nearly of all the present. 



We may, however, at once proclaim that there is an 

 enormous logical gap between Mr. Blatchford s theoretical 

 position, and the practical consequences he seeks to draw 

 from it. If we grant the former, we not merely need not, 

 but cannot, assent to the latter. If we contend for the 

 latter, we must begin by ignoring the former. 



If it is true that &quot; no man is answerable for his own 

 acts,&quot; because he has had &quot; no part in the creation of his 

 own nature &quot; (p. I o), if it is true that &quot; law is based upon 

 the false idea that men know what is right and what is 

 wrong, and have power to choose the right,&quot; whereas 

 really men are not good or bad, but merely weak or 

 strong, fortunate or unfortunate (p. 19), if it is true that 

 wrong-doers are &quot; ignorant &quot; or &quot; diseased &quot; or &quot; insane &quot; or 

 &quot; mentally deformed,&quot; and hark back &quot; atavistically &quot; to 

 the savage and the beast, if it is true that our social 

 conditions are bad, and acting on bad natures, create 

 much vice and crime, if it is true that our &quot;justice&quot; is 

 imperfect and ineffectual, and that our &quot; punishments &quot; 

 largely fail either to reform the criminal or to protect 

 society if all this is true, does it follow that &quot; all praise 

 and blame are undeserved,&quot; and that no one ought to be 

 punished (p. 203) ? And does it follow that Mr. Blatch 

 ford s client, the &quot; Bottom Dog,&quot; would fare better if he 

 were transferred from the jurisdiction of morals to the 

 tender mercies of Science, and were &quot; entitled to be 

 j.udged by the standard we apply to beasts &quot; (p. 207) ? 



Mr. Blatchford is very confident : he defies us (p. 209) 

 to deny one statement he has made, &quot; to break one link 

 of the steel chain of logic I have riveted upon our meta 

 physicians, our moralists, our kings, our judges and our 

 gods,&quot; and tells us that &quot; if all those (inferences) are not 



