xvi FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 291 



He could not be a social reformer without them. How 

 else could he argue that the social order can and should 

 be changed, or assert that disease may be prevented 

 (P- 9)&amp;gt; or Sa 7 that we ought not to blame or punish (pp. 

 J 9 99&amp;gt; etc.), or declare (p. 236) &quot;man cannot be blamed : 

 society cannot be blamed. But both can be altered: 

 by environment,&quot; or bring forward any measures for the 

 altering and improvement of the social order ? For all 

 these things imply that at least two courses of events 

 are possible possible really and not merely to our 

 ignorance and that it depends on human choice and 

 action which of them is to be realized. But in a fully 

 determined world whence are they to come ? It is vain 

 to suggest that somewhere or other there may be &quot; a man 

 with reason and knowledge and inclination for the task of 

 improving society or the individual by teaching one or both.&quot; 



If such a being exists, he will be one of the determined 

 forces of the universe, and as powerless as any of the rest 

 to alter its predestined course. The universe is destined 

 to be saved or to be damned we do not know which. 

 And if we did know, it would not matter, seeing that we 

 could not act otherwise than we do. That, inexorably, is 

 the implication of Determinism. If we wish, then, to 

 think the world as alterable for the better, as capable of 

 varying its course, we must introduce some free agency 

 into it to infuse some indetermination into it. A very 

 little will suffice. A very little freedom will falsify the 

 doctrine that everything is foredoomed in one single and 

 inevitable way, and that nothing can change its character. 

 Once there are real alternatives, and real choices, and 

 real freedom in the world, man can master his fate and 

 remould himself. 



This is the ennobling faith which every reformer must 

 hold ; but it is not Determinism. It is utterly incompatible 

 with Determinism of any sort or kind ; and if Mr. Blatch- 

 ford wishes to be consistent, he must choose between it 

 and Determinism. His choice will be a free and most 

 momentous one, but this need not prevent him from 

 weighing the alternatives which are put before him. 



