

294 HUMANISM xvi 



inherent debility of human reason, which here is driven 

 to assert the impossibility of what seems plain fact, and 

 involves itself in irrationality, whichever of the alternatives 

 it chooses. 



This, however, is by no means wholly displeasing to 

 the ordinary man, who readily reconciles himself to a 

 situation which puzzles the professors of philosophy. He 

 can the better enjoy this speculative deadlock, that it 

 causes hardly any practical inconvenience. For in prac 

 tice we all agree to use language which (as we saw) 

 implies the reality of possibilities, alternatives and free 

 choices. The Determinist no doubt uses (or should 

 use) all this phraseology with a mental reservation. He 

 believes it to be an illusory consequence of our mortal 

 ignorance, and consoles himself with the thought that if 

 he knew everything, all this evidence of Freedom would 

 disappear. But this pious hope cannot be said to make 

 any practical difference. As an agent he must, in the 

 actual state of his knowledge, behave as if there were real 

 freedom in the world. 



Hence it has been, very plausibly, contended that the 

 whole question is devoid of practical importance. If, 

 whatever the speculative position we may prefer, whether 

 we are Libertarians, Determinists or Sceptics, we are all 

 bound in our action to assume that some acts are free 

 and some alternatives real, while others are determined 

 and calculable, what need is there to solve the theoretic 

 problem ? Has it not practically solved itself? What 

 difference does it make which theory is true, if they all 

 lead to the same behaviour ? Nay, upon the latest and 

 most approved principles of pragmatic logic, must we 

 not hold that theories which lead to the same results in 

 practice are not really different at all, but only verbally 

 various ways of saying the same thing ? 



This attractive way, however, of cutting the Gordian 

 knot appears to rest upon a misconception. The believer 

 in Freedom at least cannot admit that his belief makes 

 no difference to his acts, nor believe that the Determinist s 

 belief has no influence on his behaviour. He must point 



