338 HUMANISM xvm 



cance in the scheme of things ; only so is it something 

 worth possessing, an investment more permanent and 

 more decisive of our weal and woe than all the outward 

 goods men set their hearts upon, rather than a transitory 

 bubble to whose splendour it matters not one whit whether 

 it be pure translucence refracting the radiance of the 

 sunlight, or the iridescent film that coats decay. 



The ethical argument for immortality, then, is simply 

 this, that, if death ends all, the moral life cannot be lived 

 out, moral perfection is impossible, and the universe can 

 not be regarded as at heart ethical. But in spite of 

 its simplicity this argument has been misunderstood in 

 a variety of ways. Let us briefly consider the chief of 

 these. 



It is objected by well-meaning people, who rather 

 pride themselves on their advocacy of a purer and higher 

 morality, that the ethical sphere does not need supple 

 menting by a future life. They grow indignant at the 

 thought that the good men do is buried in their graves, 

 and does not survive to inspire and direct succeeding 

 generations. They bid us therefore fight the good fight 

 disinterestedly and without selfish reward, in order that 

 our grandchildren, if we have any, may enjoy the fruits 

 of our self-denial, and that the world may be the better 

 for our efforts. 



To this the reply is twofold. It is idle to say that 

 Goodness is not wasted because the results of actions 

 reverberate throughout the ages. The good men do may 

 persist and work well or ill, but the good men are surely 

 perishes. The human character itself passes away, and 

 its effects are transmitted only through the characters of 

 others. The character itself is an indefeasible and 

 inalienable possession of the owner, and by no flight of 

 the imagination can it be transferred to others. Whatever 

 worth, therefore, we assign to character, that worth is lost 

 to the world if immortality be denied. And, moreover, it 

 is only in their effect upon his own character that a man s 

 actions can be surely classified as good or bad. What 

 the effect of actions will be on others, now or subsequently 



