350 HUMANISM xvm 



immortality is in a manner incomplete : first, because a 

 moral postulate cannot as such inform us as to the 

 method of its realization ; and secondly, because, disguise 

 it as we may, our faith in a cosmic order which includes 

 the moral remains still capable of further confirmation. 

 For, however firm our trust in the rationality of life, few 

 would contend that the discovery of scientific facts 

 consonant with our ethical demands would add nothing 

 to the assurance of their faith. 



And so, lastly, a word must be said on the subject of 

 these scientific and metaphysical arguments about im 

 mortality which were excluded as irrelevant to the ethical 

 aspect of the question, in order to bring out the important 

 fact that, however they may be supposed to result, the 

 ethical argument maintains its independent validity. So 

 far as I can see, these further arguments may result in 

 three different ways. They may confirm the ethical 

 argument in which case our confidence in immortality 

 will be strengthened. They may balance each other in 

 which case they will leave the field open for the ethical 

 argument. Or, in the worst event, they may prepon- 

 deratingly conflict with it. But, even so, it would not 

 follow that they were right and the ethical argument was 

 wrong, at least until the plea for the essential solidarity 

 of the ultimate postulates had been invalidated. A world 

 in which the ethical ideal is abrogated and annulled 

 cannot be a harmonious world ; and if it be not 

 harmonious throughout, we can feel no confidence that it 

 is harmonious in any part. In other words, so long as 

 we trust in the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge 

 and all action, we could never quite trust the non-ethical 

 arguments that are supposed to plunge us in perplexity. 



