370 HUMANISM xix 



nor yet that their doctrines were not capable of throwing 

 light upon its nature. Perhaps they have lived in as great 

 terror of it as more ordinary mortals, and so lacked the 

 courage to think about it at all. At all events I can 

 readily believe, from a study of their doctrines, that 

 Spinoza was quite right in maintaining that there is no 

 subject concerning which the sage thinks less than about 

 death. 1 Which, nevertheless, is a great pity. For the 

 sage is surely wrong. There is no subject concerning 

 which he, if he is an idealist and has tJie courage of his 

 opinions, OUGHT to think more, and OUGHT to have more 

 interesting things to say. 



In partial proof of which let me attempt to arouse him 

 to reflection by propounding some old ^paradoxes about 

 death which will, I think, be germane to our subject. 



(1) No man ever yet perished without annihilating also 

 the world in which he lived. 



(2) No man ever yet saw another die ; but if he had, he 

 would have witnessed his own annihilation. 



(3) The world is the greatest of all conventions ; but all 

 are unconventional enough to leave it. 



(4) To die is to cut off our connexion with our friends ; 

 but do they cut us, or we them, or both, or neither ? 



Now these paradoxes contain nothing but necessary 

 inferences from the idealistic view of the world, if it is 

 applied practically to the phenomenon of death, and no 

 philosopher who really and seriously accepts that view 

 should have the slightest difficulty with them. But for 

 the sake of the others I feel that it may be better to add 

 a short commentary. &quot; No man ever yet perished without 

 annihilating also the world in which he lived,&quot; i.e. the world 

 of his experience, or as we may perhaps say with still more 

 accuracy, the objective world, in so far as it was assumed 

 to explain his experience. Moreover, &quot; no man ever yet 

 saw another die, but if he had he would have witnessed 

 his own annihilation &quot; : inasmuch as he could never see 

 the other s self and so a fortiori could not observe its de- 



1 Eth. iv. Prop. 67. 

 2 Cp. S. P.R. Journal for March 1898, vol. viii. p. 204. 



