4 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. I. 



This task may appear a difficult and tedious one, but after 

 , of all it is one which comes strictly within the field of 



1 116 Slimy ui i i 11 x~U. 4- 



m er n imentai~ the experimental sciences, and is actually the most 

 certain science of them all. Its inductions repose 

 upon the most direct of observations, and its deductions are 

 tested by experiments of the most decisive kind. Whether 

 metaphysics&quot; be or be not a cloud-land, this particular 

 inquiry is at least to be made on firm ground, under a clear 

 sky, and in bright sunlight. Before, however, entering upon 

 the first inquiry, a preliminary caution may not be out of 

 place. A widely extended discussion of philosophical ques- 

 Thet.odan- tions such as that which now obtains is manifestly 

 L e v dtacS? u &quot; P en to two dangers, the one, a &quot; hasty dogmatism,&quot; 

 sums. t k e O ther, an &quot; irrational scepticism.&quot; It is common 



enough to find writers (such, e.g., as Professor Clifford) speak 

 ing in so dogmatic a tone that the unwary are in danger of 

 mistaking confident assertion for proof, while the many, ever 

 prone jurare in verba magistri, are but too apt to adopt them 

 selves the dogmatic style merely on the authority of their 

 chosen masters. For such, a judicious scepticism is the 

 necessary remedy. 



More common, however, is the danger of &quot; irrational 

 scepticism.&quot; And here a word of explanation may be ad 

 dressed to those who may be offended by this phrase, fancy 

 ing (in spite of the concluding phrase of the last paragraph) 

 that I may deem &quot;scepticism&quot; to be generally &quot;irrational.&quot; 

 But it is manifest that in philosophy, reason, and reason only, 

 is and must be the supreme and ultimate arbiter. 



Authority , 



has no place j? or a }| those who are convinced that truth is 



in philoso- 



P h y- necessarily good, it is even wrong to accept any 



thing whatever as true which has not been made evident to 

 the intellect. For such, no authority, however venerable, no 

 consequences, however calamitous, as long as they do not in 



volve a contradiction, can or ought to stand in the 



Doubt only to 

 ured 

 istiga- - - 



results the processes 01 reason. As a consequence, 



Uoubtoniyto . . . 



be cured by W av of pitiless logic in tollowing out to their nnal 



investiga- ,,5 f * 



tion. results the processes 01 reason. As a consequence, 



when any man has become a victim to doubt, he has no 



