CHAP. I.] THE STARTING-POINT. 13 



which cannot be proved or known with the highest degree of 

 certainty which is given by immediate consciousness.&quot; 



Now it may, in the first place, be contended that the pro 

 cess of analysis is incomplete. It may be denied His analysis 



... -i . -i f incomplete. 



altogether that in the primary direct act ot con 

 sciousness we recognise the truth of the existence of the 

 &quot; state &quot; one bit more than of the &quot; self.&quot; Professor Huxley 

 fails to discriminate between the &quot;self&quot; as recognised deli 

 berately by reflection, and the &quot;self&quot; as directly perceived 

 in the momentary act of consciousness. The &quot; self &quot; indeed, 

 the substantial continuous being as deliberately perceived, is 

 only explicitly recognised by reflection, and in so far as he 

 may mean this, Professor Huxley is right. But the &quot;Ego&quot; 

 of each instant is given by consciousness simultaneously with 

 its &quot; state,&quot; and just as vividly. If, therefore, the &quot; continuous 

 self&quot; is thus admitted to be secondary, nothing is thereby 

 conceded. For though the continuous substantial &quot;self&quot; is 

 not given in the momentary act of consciousness explicitly, 

 it is there implicitly. 



Our immediate direct consciousness is neither the act of 

 judgment, &quot; mental state exists,&quot; nor the judgment, &quot; self 

 exists;&quot; but is the simple apprehension of self-action, or 

 (self -f- state), and both &quot;self&quot; and &quot; state&quot; require reflection 

 for their EXPLICIT recognition. To say that the explicit 

 recognition of the existence of the &quot; state &quot; is prior to or 

 more certain than the explicit recognition of the existence of 

 the &quot; Ego &quot; is false in fact, and contradicts the affirmations 

 of our own consciousness. 



But not only does Professor Huxley fail to reach the true 

 dicta of consciousness, he also fails entirely in his ms system 



can be de- 



endeavour to construct an intelligible statement of stroyed by 



his own 



primary truth, even according to his own concep- weapons, 

 tions. As will, it is believed, shortly appear, instead of 

 presenting us with a more intelligible system than that tra 

 ditionally taught us, he ends by presenting for our accept 

 ance what is strictly and absolutely non-sense. He appears 

 to consider he has done away with baseless philosophical 



