CHAP. I.J THE STARTING-POINT. 15 



consider its several parts. Writers of the school we combat 

 the Agnostics are exceedingly apt quietly to AS con- 



J r l sidered in its 



slip into the terms of a proposition those very pans. 

 conceptions and beliefs the validity of which they deny. 

 Let us, then, see what is the meaning of the expressions, &quot; a 

 series,&quot; &quot; states of consciousness,&quot; and &quot; exists.&quot; 



1. A &quot;series&quot; means a succession of entities, in time or 

 space ; but consciousness is of the present* Let us be ever so 

 persuaded of the existence of a past series of events, all that 

 consciousness can by any possibility tell us is that we have 

 now such persuasion, and this persuasion for all conscious 

 ness by itself can vouch may be the merest delusion. But, 

 again, &quot;succession&quot; implies &quot;permanence.&quot; It is a relation 

 of which permanence is a necessary term. Things cannot 

 succeed except by relation to something which endures. 

 Much, therefore, is implied in the mere exclamation, &quot; a 

 series ! &quot; without the conception of, and a belief in, more 

 than momentary &quot;states of consciousness,&quot; this very first 

 term of the proposition is without meaning. 



2. &quot; States of consciousness !&quot; What can be the meaning 

 of this undecipherable hieroglyphic for such it is if we 

 may employ nothing but direct states of consciousness to 

 unravel it? How can a &quot;state&quot; be conscious of itself? 

 It cannot, for by so doing, it ipso facto becomes another 

 state. W T e may ask Nescients what they can mean on their 

 hypothesis, even by the naked term &quot;consciousness&quot; itself, 

 a fortiori, by what right they assume the actual being 

 of this abstract entity, and attribute to it an existence both 



* Mr. Herbert Spencer denies that consciousness is of the actual present, 

 but of the moment just passed. This contradicts at least what my own mind 

 tells me, when I concentrate my attention on any object. However, con 

 ceding the truth of Mr. Spencer s dictum, my argument is equally valid, for 

 without question if consciousness is not of the actual present, it is of such an 

 immediate past as to persuade most persons that it is of the actual present. 

 But Mr. H. Spencer s position, far from weakening my general argument as 

 to the conscious endurance of the Ego, strengthens it. For if each state is 

 passed before it is recognised, then a fortiori the Ego must persist, and have 

 the power of certainly knowing that of which it is not immediately conscious, 

 or how could it ever recognise the various states as belonging to it, and say 

 with perfect certainty, &quot;now I am thinking?&quot; 



