16 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. 1. 



capable of modification and actually modified. We must 

 surely go outside of mere direct states of consciousness we 

 must assume the existence of the substantial self, in order 

 to be able to give any sort of intelligible meaning to this 

 second term of the proposition. 



3. &quot; Exists ! &quot; Finally, let us consider this last word of 

 the proposition. It asserts the existence of something, and 

 necessarily implies a judgment as to that something by a 

 mind which perceives such existence. The necessity of 

 these implied relations is just as certain as is that of the 

 existence predicated, whatever it may be. 



But if difficulties arise even with regard to the component 

 And con- members of the proposition, &quot; a series of states of 

 whole. consciousness exists,&quot; what shall we say to that 

 judgment as a whole ? Surely no metaphysical formula was 

 ever more open to objection. 



How can &quot; a series &quot; be conscious of itself as a series ? * 

 The proposition is absolute &quot;non-sense.&quot; A state of con 

 sciousness is a state of consciousness, and no more. We, 

 indeed, may be aware of our own past states, but such states 

 cannot themselves be conscious, for direct consciousness is of 

 the present, or if of the immediate past, then only through 

 and by means of a persistent, enduring Ego. The writers 

 named, therefore, are guilty of what, on their principles, is 

 an utterly unjustifiable dogmatism in asserting that a series 

 of states of consciousness exists. All they can be justified in 

 individually asserting is &quot;thought exists;&quot; but no jot or 

 tittle will pitiless logic allow them to proceed beyond this 

 without falling into the most flagrant petitio principii, passing 

 into a transcendentalism of their own, and a positive supersti 

 tion. Though each one may assert &quot; thought exists,&quot; he is 

 unable to affirm thought existed. All he can be warranted 

 in saying is, &quot;a thought exists of a past thought having 

 existed ;&quot; but no guarantee can be devised for the truth of 

 such thoughts, except upon principles the validity of which 



* Mr. Mill fully admits this difficulty. See Ms work ou Hamilton, p. 213. 



