CHAP. I.] THE STAKTING-POINT. 21 



terms denote, and the conformity existing between the inter 

 relations of the things so denoted as they actually exist exter 

 nally and the mental judgment verbally expressed respecting 

 them. If reference is not expressly made to the truth of a 

 true proposition, its truth, none the less consists in that con 

 formity, and reposes not on the &quot; terms &quot; but the objective 

 realities they denote. There is no equivalence between the 

 terms &quot; Mr. Disraeli &quot; and &quot; England s Prime Minister,&quot; and 

 there is no truth between &quot; London Bridge &quot; and &quot; a way 

 across the river Thames.&quot; There is, however, equivalence in 

 what is denoted by the terms, and there is truth in the pro 

 position, &quot; London Bridge is a way across the river Thames : 

 that is to say, the objective facts conform to the mental judg 

 ment so expressed concerning them in other words, in the 

 relation between objective existences and the intellect. 



To return, however, to our argument : every Nescient 

 will admit that the real existence of a present actual -Necessary&quot; 

 state of consciousness is an absolute and necessary tr 

 truth to that consciousness ; so much so, that no malevolent 

 being, however powerful, could in this deceive. Were our 

 existence made up of a succession of shifting deceits, yet 

 that a thought or feeling exists at the moment we actually 

 experience its existence, is what, by universal consent, is 

 beyond question*. That &quot; a state of consciousness is,&quot; is 

 therefore a &quot; necessary truth.&quot; But as to &quot; truth,&quot; we have 

 just seen its implications ; and with regard to the word 

 &quot; necessary,&quot; it can have no meaning, except we apprehend 

 &quot; causation/ together with &quot; possibility &quot; and &quot; impossibility,&quot; 

 revealing to us a difference between actual being and merely 

 possible being, as also between the necessary and contingent 

 categories of actual being. 



If, then, the above proposition, &quot; a state of consciousness is,&quot; 

 is necessarily true, it follows that a whole world of The Agnos . 

 necessary truth is thereby and therein implied. If, i^ailcum 

 on the contrary, it be asserted that these impli- trnSisUMy 

 cations, or any of them, are untrue or invalid- 

 not objectively true then the proposition is unmeaning, and 



