CHAP. I.] THE STAKTING-POINT. 25 



the intellect shows us its own objective validity. Let him 

 who denies it beware ; for the denial of any certainty as to 

 his own existence follows logically and necessarily from such 

 negation, and thus fails all certainty whatever, even the cer 

 tainty that there is no certainty, or that the words certainty 

 and uncertainty have any difference of signification, or that 

 any words have any meaning, or that meaning or being of 

 any kind can exist, or even be really thought. 



Reference has been just above made to Mr. Herbert 

 Spencer, and as he has a different but more im- Mr Spencer . s 

 portant band of philosophical disciples than has ou e r Viow 

 Professor Huxley, and as Mr. Darwin has bestowed owfexLr 

 on him the title &quot;our great philosopher,&quot; it would ence - 

 be interesting to learn precisely his view concerning our 

 knowledge of our own existence. 



Unfortunately, Mr. Spencer is hardly clear in his enuncia 

 tions respecting our knowledge of our own continued personal 

 existence. 



In his chapter on &quot; The Substance of Mind&quot; * he remarks : 

 &quot; If by the phrase substance of mind is to be understood 

 mind as qualitatively differentiated in each portion that is 

 separable by introspection but seems homogeneous and un- 

 decomposable ; then we do know something about the sub 

 stance of Mind, and may eventually know more. Assuming f 

 an underlying something, it is possible in some cases to see, 

 and in the rest to conceive, how these multitudinous modifi 

 cations of it arise. But if the phrase is taken to mean the 

 underlying something of which these distinguishable portions 

 are formed, or of which they are modifications ; then we know 

 nothing about it, and never can know anything about it.&quot; 



Now, if by this Mr. Spencer means we cannot know our 

 own soul otherwise than in and by its acts, he only He asserts a 



truism or an 



asserts what has been ever taught by the schools to absurdity. 

 which he is most opposed. No rational metaphysician ever 



* Psychology, vol. i. p. 145. 



t It may bo well asked, on what ground shall we make this assumption ? 

 Unless he grunts a self- consciousness, which he does not grant, such an 

 assumption will be both groundless and unverifiable. 



