CHAP. I.] THE STARTING-POINT. ^7 



qualitatively undifferentiated Ego is a pure absurdity and an 

 impossibility. No wonder, then, our intellects do not appre 

 hend it. 



He tells us that the substance of mind cannot possibly 

 be known, because since &quot;every state of mind is Whathe 

 some modification of this substance of mind,&quot; SteTihee*. 

 in no state of mind can the substance of mind 4hathe f 

 be present unmodified. But this does not prove d 

 that the continuance of mind is unknowable, but only that 

 it is not knowable except in its modifications. 



Mr. Spencer talks of states of mind known as &quot; states of 

 mind,&quot; or &quot; modifications of mind.&quot; But there cannot be a 

 consciousness of difference without a comparison, and two 

 things cannot be compared if one is unknown and unknow 

 able. Therefore these &quot; states &quot; and &quot; modifications &quot; can only 

 be known as such by comparison with a &quot;persistent sub 

 stance &quot; of mind, and therefore this must be known in order 

 that we may know &quot; states of mind &quot; as &quot; states of mind.&quot; 



But an attempt to deny our knowledge of the substan 

 tial Ego, without at the same time implicitly asserting that 

 knowledge, is really an effort to escape self-consciousness, 

 which can be but very inadequately represented by the 

 conception of a man trying to jump away from his own 

 shadow. 



We may then conclude that in affirming our certain 

 knowledge of our own continued existence we hold a conclusion 

 position we can maintain against all assailants. 

 We have in that certainty a starting-point of knowledge 

 such as we set out to seek, namely, one that is thoroughly 

 satisfactory. If indeed we have not with respect to that 

 self-existence the highest degree of certainty, then the intel 

 lect is deprived of any firm foundation whereon to raise a 

 rational system of co-ordinated knowledge. But it is hoped 

 that the cavils of the Agnostics have been here met by argu 

 ments sufficient to enable even the most timid and deferential 

 readers and hearers of our modern Sophists to hold their 

 own rational convictions, and to maintain they know what 



