CHAP. II.] FIRST TRUTHS. 31 



means of it to endeavour to show what must necessarily be 

 postulated if we would rise above utter scepticism. 



We have therefore taken immediate consciousness as our 

 fundamental fact as that which is to form, and must form, 

 part of that foundation on which alone any durable philo 

 sophic edifice can now be raised. 



Next to the fact of our own continued personal existence, 



our attention may be recalled and directed to the And endea 

 vour to liar- 



certamty that we not only exist, but that we both momse our 



. 7 , J thoughts and 



mink andjeel that we have a faculty both of think- feelings. 

 ing and feeling. These truths are unquestionable whatever 

 cavils may be made as to the world external to our own minds. 



If our thoughts and feelings can be so coadjusted as to 

 result in order and harmony, if they can be arranged in 

 an orderly and reciprocally supporting collocation, we thereby 

 attain to a stable system of philosophy. And that system 

 of philosophy must be the best which harmonises the 

 whole universe of facts with least strain and most stability. 



If contradiction and discord necessarily result from every 

 attempt at such coadjustment, if our mental activity cannot 

 but end in contradictions, then we have no possible refuge 

 from utter scepticism. 



But these two entities of which we are conscious, 



&quot;thoughts&quot; and &quot;feelings,&quot; may be seen by intro- somediffer- 



. i . . ences **- 



spection to have a very different range. Our feel- tween these. 



ings, of course, as present feelings, are infallible, but they 

 refer only to what we deem present here and now, or to the 

 recent past. Our thoughts, on the other hand, can range 

 over all conceivable time and space, and with equal infallibi 

 lity affirm such propositions as, e.g., that always and every 

 where &quot; the whole is greater than its part,&quot; &quot; whatever 

 thinks, exists.&quot; Moreover, looking into our own minds 

 shows us that thought exercised about feelings does not 

 attain to the same degree of certainty and conviction 

 which it can attain to when exercised about certain other 

 thoughts. We see that there may be possible sources of 

 error. Thus, e.g., when we say, &quot; I see that chair,&quot; we have 



