CHAP. II.] FIRST TRUTHS. 35 



and improvable self-evident truths to be sought?&quot; Mani 

 festly by introspection alone the careful analysis of con 

 sciousness by each one for himself. 



In order successfully to combat with those who accept 

 idealism we must, for the sake of those who do not accept the 

 nature-given bridge between object and subject, begin from 

 a purely subjective basis. 



This, as has been said, is the method declared necessary by 

 Mr. Spencer himself, and he also tells us * to the same effect : 



&quot; The first step in a metaphysical argument, rightly carried on, 

 must be an examination of propositions for the purpose of ascertaining 

 what character is common to those which we call unquestionably true, 

 and is implied by asserting their unquestionable truth. Further, to 

 carry on this inquiry legitimately, we must restrict our analysis rigor 

 ously to states of consciousness considered in their relations to one 

 another: wholly ignoring anything beyond consciousness to which 

 these states and their relations may be supposed to refer. For, if, before 

 we have ascertained by comparing propositions what is the trait that 

 leads us to class some of them as certainly true, we avowedly or tacitly 

 take for granted the existence of something beyond consciousness; 

 then, a particular proposition is assumed to be certainly true before we 

 have ascertained what is the distinctive character of the propositions 

 which we call certainly true, and the analysis is vitiated. If we cannot 

 transcend consciousness if, therefore, what we know as truth must be 

 some mental state, or some combination of mental states ; it must be 

 possible for us to say in what way we distinguish this state or these 

 states. The definition of truth must be expressible in terms of con 

 sciousness; and, indeed, cannot otherwise be expressed if conscious 

 ness cannot be transcended. Clearly, then, the metaphysician s first 

 step must be to shut out from his investigation everything but what is 

 subjective ; not taking for granted the existence of anything objective 

 corresponding to his ideas, until he has ascertained what property of 

 his ideas it is which he predicates by calling them true.&quot; 



Now, although I have the good fortune to agree, to a 

 certain extent, with Mr. Herbert Spencer as to the limits and 

 necessary conditions of inquiry, yet my view as to the ulti 

 mate and final test of all truth whatever differs profoundly 

 and fundamentally from his. 



I differ from him, and deem his conception of this test to 



Essays, vol. ii. p. 400 (stereotyped edition). 



D 2 



