36 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. II. 



be inadequate and false, because he makes that test a purely 

 negative one. He asserts that &quot;inconceivability&quot; is the 

 ultimate and supreme test of truth. 

 He tells us : * 



&quot;A discussion in consciousness proves to be simply a trial of 

 strength between different connexions in consciousness a systematized 

 struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent states of 

 consciousness. And the result of the struggle is, that the least coherent 

 states of consciousness separate, while the most coherent remain toge 

 ther ; forming a proposition of which the predicate persists in the mind 

 along with its subject. ... If there are any indissoluble connexions, 

 he is compelled to accept them. If certain states of consciousness 

 absolutely cohere in certain ways, he is obliged to think them in those 

 ways. . . . Here, then, the inquirer comes down to an ultimate 

 laniformity a universal law of thinking.&quot; 



As I have said, I consider Mr. Spencer s test inadequate, 

 Mr spencer s an( l am convinced that his analysis of consciousness 

 JSte tratha i 8 incomplete and misleading. He fails to distin- 

 mereiyTegi 6 - guish between two distinct classes of ultimate psy 

 chical phenomena, and consequently does not really 

 accept, as he professes to do, the absolute dicta of con 

 sciousness for the basis of his philosophy. He fails to dis 

 tinguish between merely negative mental impotencies or 

 simple inconceivabilities on the one hand and positive per 

 ceptions or intuitions on the other. He fails to note the 

 utterly different classes of judgments which severally affirm 

 either that they simply cannot conceive a given proposition 

 to be true, or that they positively do see that the opposite of 

 a given proposition cannot be true. Negative perceptions 

 of simple inconceivability are reflex, but positive intuitions 

 (as when I gaze at a picture on the wall before me) are 

 direct. 



Mr. Spencer distinguishes between two classes of unbeliev 

 able propositions, namely : (1) the simply unbelievable or in 

 credible, and (2) the inconceivable. He defines f the former 

 as a proposition &quot; which admits of being framed in thought, 



* Psychology, vol. ii. p. 450. 

 t Ibid. vol. ii. p. 408. 



