CHAP. II.] FIEST TRUTHS. 47 



Mr. Bain, instead of, with Mr. Spencer, taking mental im 

 potence as the ultimate criterion of truth, lays down Mr Baln . s 

 two postulates, (1) the absence of contradiction, &quot;er^of cn 

 and (2) the uniformity of nature, as his basis. 



As to the first postulate, such a test is evidently quite un 

 fitted for its purpose ; since to accept without question the 

 fact that we have had past experiences is at once to assume 

 that very objectivity the acceptance of which has yet to be 

 justified. Accordingly we find Mr. Bain somewhat naively 

 further postulating &quot; trust in memory &quot; as one of the 

 guarantees of his ultimate postulates. 



As to the second postulate, he tells us :* &quot; The fact gene 

 rally expressed of nature s uniformity, is the guarantee, the 

 ultimate major premiss of all induction.&quot; .... &quot;We can 

 give no reason, no evidence, for this uniformity ; and, there 

 fore, the course seems to be to adopt this as the finishing 

 postulate.&quot; A glance inwards will, I think, convince most 

 unprejudiced readers that their subjective certainty as to the 

 &quot; uniformity of nature,&quot; considered by itself, is slight indeed, 

 compared with their conviction that &quot; what thinks exists,&quot; 

 or that &quot; the whole is greater than its part.&quot; 



Mr. Lewes s ultimate postulate and foundation of all truth 

 is &quot; the equivalence of the terms of a proposition ;&quot; and he 

 endeavours to reduce the logical principles of identity, con 

 tradiction, and excluded middle to his &quot;principle of equi 

 valence.&quot; But his principle is only to be tested by the 

 principle of identity itself; and the very application of this 

 test assumes objectivity (as it involves memory and the 

 substantial Ego), and the action of an intellect which sees 

 the necessity that whatever is must be that which it mo 

 mentarily is that nothing can both be and not be at the 

 same time and in the same sense. 



Here a few words may be added respecting Mr. Spencer 

 and the principle of contradiction. One would have The principle 



, , , -, ,, - of contradic- 



thought that this law would have been lully ad- tion. 



* Logic, vol. i. p. 273. 



