CHAP. II.] FIEST TEUTHS. 51 



stating what has been, but now is not, present to sense.&quot; 

 This is an excellent exposition of what may be, and probably 

 is, that complex association of sensations which takes place in 

 brutes, and causes some of their actions to simulate inference. 

 It quite fails, however, to recognise that active light of the in 

 tellect by which we know we see a conclusion in the premisses 

 which we express by the word &quot; therefore,&quot; and which we 

 recognise as something fundamentally different from the re 

 currence of one set of sensations with another with which habit 

 has previously associated them. Hence the curious passage,* 

 in which Mr. Lewes, addressing self-conscious men, says: 

 &quot; To understand what reasoning is, we must first see it in 

 animals.&quot; And yet he admits :f &quot; that although a conclusion 

 is always implicitly in its premisses, it is not always explicitly 

 there, and a middle term may be used to point out this 

 inconspicuous relation.&quot; But all that rational logicians assert 

 of syllogistic reasoning is, that it is a process serving to 

 make implicit truth explicit to us. He continues :| &quot; Could 

 we realise all the links in the chain &quot; (of reasoning) &quot; by re 

 ducing conceptions to perceptions, and perceptions to sen- 

 sibles (and this would be effected by placing the correspond 

 ing objects in their actual order as a sensible series), our 

 most abstract reasonings would be a succession of sensations.&quot; 

 This is confused and misleading. Such a process, if possible, 

 would make us dispense with reasoning, in the case supposed, 

 but it would not make our &quot; reasonings &quot; into &quot; successions 

 of sensations,&quot; the reasonings would cease. Reasonings are 

 also represented by philosophy as having no place in intel 

 ligences higher than our own in pure intelligences but for 

 another reason, namely, the power of such intelligences to see 

 directly, truth which to us is implicit, i.e., to see it without the 

 need of any process such as we require to render it explicit. 



In this and the preceding chapter it has been endeavoured, 

 very imperfectly, to take for granted nothing not vouched for 



* Problems of Life and Mind, vol. ii. p. 162. 

 t Op. tit. p. 165. J Op. cit. p. 169. 



E 2 



