CHAPTER III. 



THE EXTERNAL WORLD. 



&quot; The real existence of an external world made up of objects possess 

 ing qualities such as our faculties declare they do possess, cannot 

 be logically denied, and may rationally be affirmed. &quot; 



IN the two preceding chapters the endeavour has been made 

 to take for granted as little as might be possible A justifies- 

 such facts as are not given in immediate conscious- belief in the 

 ness. It has, indeed, been sought to show that world here 



-, ,, , . logically re- 



our very consciousness itsell demands, at the price quired, 

 of utter scepticism, the recognition of the validity of our 

 conviction that something beyond consciousness really exists. 

 But the very title of this work implies the belief of its 

 author in the real existence of external, material nature, 

 and its purpose cannot further be pursued consistently with 

 out an attempt to justify such belief. 



Fortunately, that justification is as little really required 

 for the mass of even the most cultivated part of mankind, 

 as is the justification of our conviction of our own con 

 tinued existence. As, however, to be logical, it was necessary 

 for us to start by justifying the latter conviction, it is 

 similarly needful that the more or less sceptical cavils pre 

 valent with respect to our real knowledge of the material 

 world should be disposed of in order that the subsequently 

 treated matters may not come before us out of their logical 

 order. 



Ever since Descartes and Locke, more or less scepticism, 

 more or less uncertainty respecting the truth of our conviction 

 as to a really existing material world has prevailed amongst 



