58 LESSONS FROM NATUEE. [CHAP. III. 



even actively combats idealism. To his own system he gives 

 the title of &quot; Transfigured Kealism.&quot; 



In the seventh part of his Psychology, Mr. Spencer justifies 

 in several ways what he thus calls &quot;realism,&quot; that is, his 

 belief that the external, material world really exists objec 

 tively, &quot;and in such a way that each change in the objective 

 reality causes in the subjective state a change exactly 

 answering to it so answering as to constitute a cognition 



of it.&quot;* 



This view lie justifies by an argument from &quot;priority,&quot; i.e., 

 ins justified- from tne fact tllat tne realistic conception is prior 

 tionotu. to j.j ie id ea ]i s tic conception, so that t &quot;in no mind 

 whatever can the idealistic conception be reached except 

 through the realistic one.&quot; 



He also justifies it by an &quot; argument from simplicity,&quot; 

 which consists of a demonstration that, if our conviction of 

 the world s existence is not an intuition but an inference, 

 then the system of idealism is an inference indefinitely more 

 cumbrous and complex, and therefore more liable to error. 

 He says : t 



&quot; While the first involves but a single mediate act, the second in 

 volves a succession of mediate acts, each of which is itself made up of 

 several mediate acts. Hence, if the one mediate act of Realism is to 

 be invalidated by the multitudinous acts of Idealism, it must be on 

 the supposition that if there is doubtfulness in a single step of a given 

 kind, there is less doubtfulness in many steps of this kind.&quot; 



Finally, he advances an &quot;argument from distinctness,&quot; 

 which reposes on the far greater vividness of sensations than 

 of ideas which, according to Mr. Spencer, are but plexuses of 

 faint sensations. 



He also contends against thinkers of the schools of 

 Hume, Berkeley, and Kant, that their very expositions of 

 idealism cannot be made without the use of terms which 

 imply that very realism they deny. 



* Psychology, vol. ii. p. 497. The italics are ours. 



t Op. cit. p. 374. 



j Op. cit. p. 378. 



Op. cit. pp. 312-366. 



