60 LESSONS FROM NATUEE. [CHAP. III. 



themselves, but hung round instead with tables of the 

 chemical formulae of animal substances, the disappointment 

 of his guests would hardly.be less than that of many readers 

 who, having read his arguments from priority, simplicity, 

 and distinctness, come finally upon &quot; transfigured realism &quot; as 

 the result. 



I am, of course, quite aware of the distinctions drawn by 

 Mr. Spencer between what he calls crude realism and the 

 realism adopted by him, but whether or not his metaphysical 

 position be tenable, I am quite certain it cannot be defended 

 by arguments which are valid only to support that dualism, 

 that distinctness yet true correspondence between matter 

 and mind, which has been, and ever will be, the natural and 

 practically ineradicable spontaneous conviction of mankind. 



To criticism of this kind, however, as made by Mr. Henry 

 His reply to Sidgwick, Mr. Spencer has replied at length in the 

 criticism. Fortnightly Eeview for November 1873. In 

 order, therefore, to be quite sure of not misrepresenting him 

 or doing him unintentional injustice, I quote his reply in 

 extenso. He tells us : 



&quot; All which my argument implies is that the direct intuition of 

 Realism must be held of superior authority to the arguments of Anti- 

 Realism, where their deliverances cannot be rtconcihd. The one point on 

 which their deliverances cannot be reconciled is the existence of an 

 objective reality. But while against this intuition of Realism I hold 

 the arguments of Anti-Realism to be powerless, because they cannot be 

 carried on without postulating that which they end by denying ; yet, 

 having admitted objective existence as a necessary postulate, it is pos 

 sible to make valid criticisms upon all those judgments which Crude 

 Realism joins with this primordial judgment : it is possible to show 

 that a transfigured interpretation of properties and relations is more 

 tenable than the original interpretation. 



&quot; To elucidate the matter, let us take the most familiar case in 

 which the indirect judgments of Reason correct the direct judgments 

 of Common Sense. The direct judgment of Common Sense is that the 

 Sun moves round the Earth. In course of time, Reason finds certain 

 difficulties in accepting this dictum as true. Eventually, Reason hits 

 upon an hypothesis which explains the anomalies, but which denies 

 this apparently-certain dictum of Common Sense. What is the recon 

 ciliation ? It consists in showing to Common Sense a mode of inter- 



