CHAP. III.] THE EXTERNAL WORLD. 63 



to be severally simple, homogeneous, unanalysable, or of in 

 scrutable natures, yet they are not so. There is at least one 

 kind of feeling which, as ordinarily experienced, seems ele 

 mentary, that is, demonstrably, not elementary.&quot; ...&quot; Mu 

 sical sound is the name we give to this seemingly simple 

 feeling, which is clearly resolvable into simpler feelings.&quot; 

 He then goes on to remind us that slow taps are heard as 

 taps, but when very rapid &quot; the noises are no longer identi 

 fied in separate states of consciousness, and there arises in 

 place of them a continuous state of consciousness, called a 

 tone ;&quot; that this rises in pitch with the rapidity of the taps, 

 and that other simultaneous similar series produce timbre. This 

 is further enforced elsewhere (p. 199), by recalling to mind 

 how the same vibrating tuning-fork jars the teeth, and at the 

 same time &quot; awakens &quot; through the skull &quot; a consciousness of 

 sound,&quot; apparently showing that the very same thing is under 

 different circumstances &amp;lt;; feeling of touch &quot; and &quot; perception 

 of tone.&quot; The fallacy which Mr. Spencer has here fallen 

 into is the one well known in logic as the fallacia unius 

 causaso\\Q fully discussed by Mr. Mill in his chapter on 

 the law of causation. 



But I deny in toto the truth of Mr. Spencer s assertions 

 as to such feelings. Not only I deny that the The troth of 



!_ j j i )&amp;gt; i 1 , his affirma- 



one kind ot leeling selected is &quot; demonstrably &quot;ons denied 

 not elementary,&quot; but I affirm that it is demonstrable that 

 what Mr. Spencer terms its &quot;proximate components&quot; 

 are no parts of it at all. My position may be demon 

 strated thus : Kecurring sensations of beating and jar do 

 not become a sound, they are &quot; sound &quot; at once, as soon as 

 perceived by the auditory organ at all. Similarly a musical 

 note is not made up of rapid audible beats, but only begins 

 to exist when the beat-sounds cease. A &quot; perception of mu 

 sical tone&quot; and a perception of &quot; beat&quot; are different feelings. 

 All that Mr. Spencer really shows and proves is that diverse 

 conditions result in the evocation of diverse simple percep 

 tions, of which perceptions such conditions are the occasions. 

 He does not in the least show that such perceptions (of a 



