64 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. III. 



musical note) are made up of other sensations (slightly-heard, 

 shocks, or raps). The first sensations, the heard-raps, cease 

 entirely, and give place to the other musical note, but there 

 is no evidence that they constitute the other. 



According to Mr. Spencer s argument, if a certain number 

 of taps produce a pleasant feeling, and an increased number 

 in the same time cause pain, we must conclude that pleasure 

 and pain are the same feeling ! The physical conditions of 

 feeling are one thing, the feelings themselves are another. 

 With different physical conditions \\Q may have different 

 feelings. Because two kinds of auditory sensation have for 

 cause the same visible object in different states, it. no more 

 follows that they are the same than that seeing and hearing 

 are the same because a vibrating cord is seen by the eye as 

 well as heard by the ear. 



To an objection of Mr. Sidg wick s, that &quot;Mr. Spencer, for 

 Mr.spencer s the purposes of objective psychology, apparently 

 ch p ar y g e t0 of the professes to know matter and motion really, while, 

 as a result of subjective analysis, he concludes that 

 they cannot be known,&quot; Mr. Spencer himself replies 

 as follows : 



&quot; Doubtless there seems here to be what he calls a fundamental 

 incoherence. But I think it exists, not between my two expositions, 

 but between the two consciousnesses of subjective and objective exist 

 ence, which we cannot suppress and yet cannot put into definite forms. 

 The alleged incoherence I take to be but another name for the inscru 

 tability of the relation between subjective feeling and its objective 

 correlate which is not feeling an inscrutability which meets us at the 

 bottom of all our analyses. An exposition of this inscrutability I have 

 elsewhere summed up thus : 



&quot; See, then, our predicament. We can think of Matter only in terms 

 of Mind. We can think of Mind only in terms of Matter. When we 

 have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we 

 are referred to the second for a final answer ; and when we have got 

 the final answer of the second, we are referred back to the first for an 

 interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y ; then we find 

 the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may continue for ever 

 without coming nearer to a solution.&quot; Prin. of Psy., 272. 



&quot; Carrying a little further this simile, will, I think, show where lies 

 the insuperable difficulty felt by Mr. Sidgwick. Taking x and y as 



