CHAP. III.] THE EXTERNAL WORLD. 65 



the subjective and objective activities, unknown in their natures and 

 known only as phenomenally manifested ; and recognizing the fact 

 that every state of consciousness implies, immediately or remotely, the 

 action of object on subject or subject on object, or both ; we may say 

 that every state of consciousness will be symbolized by some modifica 

 tion of x y the phenomenally-known product of the two unknown 

 factors. In other words, xy , a y, x y , x&quot;j, , x y&quot;, &c., &c., will represent 

 all perceptions and thoughts. Suppose, now, that these are thoughts 

 aboiit the object ; composing some hypothesis respecting its characters 

 as analyzed by physicists. Clearly, all such thoughts, be they about 

 shapes, resistances, momenta, molecules, molecular motions, or what 

 not, will contain some form of the subjective activity x. Now let the 

 thoughts be concerning mental processes. It must similarly happen 

 that some mode of the unknown objective activity y will be in every 

 case a component. Now suppose that the problem is the genesis of 

 mental phenomena ; and that in the course of the inquiry bodily organi 

 zation and the functions of the nervous system are brought into the 

 explanation. It will happen, as before, that these, considered as ob 

 jective, have to be described and thought about in modes of x y. And 

 when by the actions of such a nervous system, conceived objectively in 

 modes of x y, and acted upon by physical forces which are conceived in 

 other modes of y y, we endeavour to explain the genesis of sensations, 

 perceptions, and ideas, which we can think of only in other modes of 

 x y, we find that all our factors, and therefore all our interpretations, 

 contain the two unknown terms, and that no interpretation is imaginable 

 that will not contain the two unknown terms. 



&quot; What is the defence for this apparent^ circular process ? Simply 

 that it is a process of establishing conyruily among our symbols. It is 

 finding a mode of so symbolizing the unknown activities, subjective 

 and objective, and so operating with our symbols, that all our acts 

 may be rightly guided guided, that is, in such ways that we can anti 

 cipate, when, where, and in what quantity one of our symbols will be 

 found. Mr. Sidgwick s difficiTlty arises, I think, from having insuffi 

 ciently borne in mind the statements made at the outset, in The Data 

 of Philosophy, that such conceptions as are vital, or cannot be 

 separated from the rest without mental dissolution, must be assumed 

 as true provisionally ; ? that there is no mode of establishing the validity 

 of any belief except that of showing its entire congruity with all other 

 beliefs, and that Philosophy, compelled to make those fundamental 

 assumptions without which thought is impossible, has to justify them 

 by showing their congruity with all other dicta of consciousness. 

 In pursuance of this distinctly-avowed mode of procedure, I assume 

 as true, provisionally, certain modes of formulating the manifestations 

 of the unknown objective activity, certain modes of formulating the 

 manifestations of the unknown subjective activity, and certain result 

 ing modes of conceiving the operations of the one on the other. These 



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