70 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. III. 



all ; it becomes impossible to suppose any identity between 

 this objective connection and some one of the multitudinous 

 subjective relations answering to it.&quot; But surely this is the 

 very poorest and shallowest sophistry. No one has supported 

 the assertion of &quot;IDENTITY&quot; even between the intellectual 

 concept gathered from changing phenomena, and the object 

 of that concept itself ; still less between it and &quot; some one of 

 the multitudinous subjective relations [feelings] answering to 

 it.&quot; But this absence of identity does not even go one step 

 towards invalidating the correspondence between certain of 

 the objective characters of objects and intellectual cognitions 

 of such objects in and by the sensations they occasion, which 

 sensations present them (in the sense of &quot;make them present&quot; 

 to the intellect. 



Next (p. 215, 91) he examines compound relations of 

 on the effects sequence, and he considers that herein qualitative 

 agfand^t e differences of apprehension may be produced by the 

 of sequence 8 , different structures of different animals, adding, 

 &quot; there is most likely a marked qualitative difference between 

 that undeveloped sense of duration derived solely from the 

 experiences of inner changes, and that developed conception 

 of time derived mainly from outer changes, but conceived to 

 be a form of both outer and inner changes.&quot; 



Now as to qualitative differences in animal sensations, all 

 Mr. Spencer requires may be conceded, as such differences 

 are but the materials of intellect. But if an intellectual 

 animal could think by means of such materials of merely in 

 ternal sensations as those Mr. Spencer supposes, such an 

 animal would perceive time itself to be such as (like in 

 nature to) the time we perceive though its mode of arriving 

 at such perception would be different. It need hardly be 

 added that there is indeed a difference of quality between 

 our perception of time and any feelings of a polyp. 



As to quantitative differences of perception of sequence 

 he remarks (p. 216) : &quot; Months to the old man appear no 

 longer than weeks to the young man.&quot; Just so, the old man 

 remarks a changed condition of sensibility, and he perceives 



