72 LESSONS FEOM NATUBE. [CiiAP. III. 



nor, probably, would even Mr. Spencer have ever confounded 

 them together had not his theory obliged him to do so. 



Mr. Spencer concludes this section by saying that &quot; com 

 pound relations of sequences as we conceive them cannot be 

 quantitatively like the connections beyond consciousness to 

 which they refer, is proved by the facts that they vary in their 

 apparent lengths with the structure of the organism, with its 

 size, with its age, with its constitutional state, with the 

 number and vividness of the impressions it receives, and with 

 their relative positions in consciousness. Manifestly, as no 

 one of these variously-estimated lengths can be taken as valid 

 rather than the others, it becomes impossible to suppose 

 equality between an interval of time as present to conscious 

 ness, and any nexus of things which it symbolises.&quot; But 

 these difficulties as to time may be answerer! in a way parallel 

 to that in which those of space were replied to. &quot; Feelings &quot; 

 change, but do not necessarily carry with them changes in 

 the intellectual perceptions they occasion ; nay, the very fact 

 of the phenomenal changes brings out yet more clearly the 

 objectivity they reveal, and which is known by and to the 

 intellect correctly, in spite of sensational variations, when the 

 organism is not so deranged that the intellectual faculties are 

 thereby paralysed. 



He then (p. 219, 92) proceeds to consider the compound 

 relation of difference, and he infers that (since it &quot; has to be 

 conceived in terms of impressions that differ ; and since the 

 conception of difference cannot be dissociated from the order 

 of impressions in which it is presented, if there is but one 

 such order&quot;), the &quot; conception of difference becomes more in 

 dependent of particular differences,&quot; &quot;in proportion as the 

 impressions become more multitudinous in their kinds,&quot; &quot; and 

 that, therefore, in higher creatures it is not qualitatively the same 

 as in lower creatures&quot; This should in fact be thus amplified, 

 and such amplification would do away with that confusion 

 between intellect and sense which Mr. Spencer makes. He 

 should say : Therefore in higher creatures the material (the 

 direct sensitive cognition of things ivhich differ) is gradually 



