76 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. III. 



qualities of the objective world has the same basis as has its 

 report as to the objective existence of that objective world, 

 and the latter reposes on reason, as Mr. Spencer truly repre 

 sents. He ends the chapter (p. 225, 05) by referring to 

 the assumption universally made that &quot;there exist beyond 

 consciousness, conditions of objective manifestation which are 

 symbolised by relations as we conceive them.&quot; &quot;The very 

 proposition that what we l&amp;lt;now as a relation .... does not 

 resemble any order or nexus beyond consciousness, implies 

 that there exists some such order or nexus beyond conscious 

 ness.&quot; But how can it be &quot;some such&quot; order or nexus if 

 there is no resemblance between them &quot;no likeness be 

 tween them either in kind or degree?&quot; (p. 194, 78). The 

 only meaning Mr. Spencer can really have is that which all 

 philosophers would, of course, concede, namely, that objec 

 tive conditions are not identical with subjective sensibilities, 

 though made known to us through the latter by a complex 

 and indirect process. 



He then concludes by asserting the reality of an absolute 

 AS to the and unknowable ontological order, giving rise to 



reality of an i , 



ontoiogicai the phenomenal order, and an ontological nexus 



order and 



nexus. giving rise to phenomenal differences. &quot; Though 

 the relation of difference constituted, as we have seen, by a 

 change in consciousness, cannot be IDENTIFIED with anything 

 beyond consciousness ; yet that there is something beyond 

 consciousness to which it is due, is an inevitable conclusion ; 

 since to think otherwise is to think of change taking place 

 without an antecedent&quot; (pp. 226, 227). In the last words 

 we see Mr. Spencer admits the fundamental nature of the 

 law of causality. But the word &quot;identified&quot; should be care 

 fully noted. Certainly what he speaks of cannot be identified, 

 but whoever said it could ? Whoever thought of identifying 

 the mechanism of perception with the thing perceived ? If 

 he had only contended against &quot; identity&quot; instead of against 

 &quot; likeness &quot; &quot; either in kind or degree,&quot; there would have 

 been no word to dispute, and no ill effects would have been 

 involved, in his system. The ontological order dark to 



