CHAP. TIT.] THE EXTERNAL WOELD. 79 



tions. Ac-cording to Mr. Lewes (if I have not misunderstood 

 his very obscure expressions on the subject), it seems that 

 there need be no objective, continued connexion between 

 that non-ego which, joined with the ego, is &quot; a hot stone,&quot; 

 and that non-ego which, joined with the ego, is &quot; a cold 

 stone.&quot; If there is a persistent bond between these two non- 

 egos, which is not also a bond between &quot;the stone&quot; and 

 &quot; grass,&quot; or any other parts of non-ego factors, then he must 

 admit a real objective substance known to the intellect, but 

 not to sense, in the stone. 



He says : * &quot;To say that we do not know the objects, but 

 only the feelings they excite in us, is simply saying that we 

 do not know what objects are in other relations than those of 

 feeling a truism which is quite irrelevant, but a truism on 

 which metaphysicians have erected the idle mystery of the 

 Ding an sich&quot; Now I maintain that our intellect clearly 

 tells us that we do &quot; know what objects are in other relations 

 than those of feeling,&quot; and that, therefore, instead of a 

 &quot;truism,&quot; it is afalsism. 



But after all Mr. Lewes s protests against Mr. Spencer s 

 system, his own is fundamentally very like it, for he Agrees with 

 tells ust (speaking of light and the luminiferous todamen! r 

 undulations) : &quot; We know that the undulations are tf 

 present beyond the red and violet ends of the spectrum. 

 .... Our cosmos is indeed the universe of feeling ; but 

 we postulate an universe of being ; and the warrant for this 

 postulate is the experience of ever-fresh accessions from the 

 unknown to the known !&quot; Mr. Lewes indeed can postulate 

 no more than possibilities of fresh feelings. 



But if he knows nothing but feelings, what can he mean 

 by postulating a universe of being? for by that he must 

 mean the &quot; unf elt,&quot; which in his system is if not non-existent 

 quite inexpressible, and practically equivalent to the un 

 knowable of Mr. Spencer. He refrains indeed from saying 

 that any changes in this being accompany changes in feeling. 



* Op. cit. p. 419. t Op. cit. p. 235. 



