CHAP. V.] DUTY AND PLEASUEE. 97 



in this world but also confer upon them prolonged happiness 

 in the next. Hence we must judge of the moral or non- 

 moral condition of savage tribes by their own declarations 

 when these can be obtained or by expressive actions as far 

 as possible the equivalent of such declarations. We have 

 already seen the essential community of intellectual nature 

 existing amongst all living races of men as regards the 

 faculty of speech. From the existence of this community 

 of nature, \ve may fairly conclude that deliberate articulate 

 judgments of lower races have substantially the same mean 

 ing as those of our own race, whatever may be the con 

 crete actions which occasion the expression of such abstract 

 judgments. 



We are all familiar with the constantly employed expres 

 sions denoting moral judgments amongst ourselves, The distinct- 

 and those amongst us who reflect upon the subject conception 



n ,t , generally ad- 



are generally aware that in asserting that anything muted. 



is &quot;right&quot; they mean to make a judgment altogether dis 

 tinct from one asserting the same thing to be pleasurable 

 or advantageous. Even men who, like the late John 

 Stuart Mill, assert that the principle regulating our actions 

 should be the production of the greatest amount of pleasure 

 to all sentient beings, must assert that there is either no 

 obligation at all to accept this principle itself, or that such 

 obligation is a &quot;moral&quot; one. The distinction being then 

 generally and practically recognised as existing amongst our 

 selves, we have to examine the following points. Whether 

 there is any evidence that moral perceptions are wanting in 

 any savage tribes ? Whether any races exist in a condition 

 which may be considered as a transitional state between our 

 own and the non-moral condition of beasts ? Whether any 

 peoples have their moral perceptions so perverted so remote 

 from those of the highest races as to result in the forma 

 tion of abstract judgments directly contradicting the abstract 

 moral judgments of such highest races ? 



In this matter it is very necessary to be greatly on our 

 guard against the involuntary misrepresentations and the 



H 



