CHAP. V.] DUTY AND PLEASURE. 107 



having in view all the time nothing but the future reception 

 of a good legacy. Another may, in the dark, shoot his own 

 father, taking him to be an assassin, and so commit what is 

 materially an act of parricide, though formally it is only an 

 act of self-defence of more or less culpable rashness. A 

 woman may innocently, because ignorantly, marry a married 

 man, and so commit a material act of adultery. She may 

 discover the facts, and persist, and so make her act formal 

 also. 



Actions of brutes, such as those of the Lee, the ant, or the 

 beaver, however materially good as regards their relation to 

 the community to which such animals belong, are absolutely 

 destitute of the most incipient degree of real, i.e., formal 

 &quot;goodness,&quot; because unaccompanied by mental acts of 

 conscious will directed towards the fulfilment of duty. 



Mr. Darwin does not hesitate to declare distinctly that the 

 &quot; moral sense&quot; is but a mere result of the develop- Mr. Darwin s 

 ment of brutal instincts. He maintains, &quot; the first views 

 foundation or origin of the moral sense lies in the social 

 instincts, including sympathy ; and these instincts no doubt 

 were primarily gained, as in the case of the lower animals, 

 through natural selection&quot; ( Descent of Man, vol. ii. 

 p. 394). 



Everything, however, depends upon what we mean by the 

 &quot; moral sense.&quot; It is a patent fact that there does exist a 

 perception of the qualities &quot; right &quot; and &quot; wrong &quot; attaching 

 to certain actions. However arising, men have a conscious 

 ness of an absolute and immutable rule legitimately claiming 

 obedience with an authority necessarily supreme and abso 

 lute in other words, intellectual judgments are formed 

 which imply the existence of an ethical idea in the judging 

 mind. 



It is, as has been already said, the existence of this power 

 which has to be accounted for; neither its application nor 

 even its validity have to be considered. Yet instances of 

 difference of opinion respecting the moral value of particular 

 concrete actions are often brought forward as if they could 



