CHAP. V.] DITTY AND PLEASURE. 100 



Bnt the very essence of moral action is that it is not followed 

 independently of reason. 



When Mr. Darwin says,* u For my part I would as soon 

 be descended from that heroic little monkey, &e., as from a 

 savajre who delights to torture his enemies, offers up bloody 

 sacrifices, &C., and is haunted by the grossest superstitions,&quot; 

 it only shows that he has not even the faintest conception of 

 what a ** moral nature &quot; is. 



Haying stated our wide divergence from Mr. Darwin with 

 respect to what the term &quot;moral sense&quot; denotes, we might 

 be dispensed from criticising instances which mast from our 

 point of view be irrelevant, as Mr. Darwin would probably 

 admit. Nevertheless, let ns examine a few of these instances, 

 and see if we can discover in them any justification of the 

 views he propound*. 



As illustrations of the development of self-reproach for the 

 neglect of some good action, he observes : Mr. 



O * i-nuf 



&quot;A young pointer, when it first scents game, apparently cannot 

 help pointing. A squirrel in a cage who pate the nuts which it 

 cannot eat, as if to bury them in the ground, can hardly be thought to 

 act thus either from pleasure or pain. Hence the common assump 

 tion that men must be impelled to every action by experiencing some 

 pleasure or pain may be erroneous. Although a habit may be blindly 

 and implicitly follower], independently of any pleasure or pain felt at 

 the moment, yet if it be forcibly and abruptly checked, a vague sense 

 of dissatisfaction is generally experienced ; and this is especially true 

 in regard to persons of feeble intellect.&quot; Vol. i. p. 80. 



Now, passing over the question whether in the &quot;pointing&quot; 

 and &quot;patting&quot; referred to there may not be some agreeable 

 sensations, we contend that such instincts have nothing to 

 do with &quot;morality,&quot; from their blind nature, such blindness 

 simply ipao facto eliminating every vestige of morality from 

 an action. 



Mr. Darwin certainly exaggerates the force and extent of 

 social sympathetic feelings. Mr. Mill admits that they are 



* Descent of Man, vol. ii. p. 404. 



