110 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. V. 



&quot; often wanting ;&quot; but Mr. Darwin claims the conscious pos 

 session of such feelings for all, and quotes Hume as saying 

 that the view of the happiness of others &quot; communicates a 

 secret joy,&quot; while the appearance of their misery &quot;throws a 

 melancholy damp over the imagination.&quot; * One might wish 

 that this remark were universally true, but unfortunately 

 some men take pleasure in the pain of others; and Laroche- 

 foucauld even ventured on the now well-known saying, &quot; that 

 there is something in the misfortunes of our best friends not 

 unpleasant to us/ But our feeling that the sufferings of 

 others are pleasant or unpleasant has nothing to do with the 

 question, which refers to the judgment whether the indulging 

 of such feelings is &quot; right &quot; or &quot; wrong.&quot; 



If the &quot;social instinct&quot; were the real basis of the moral 

 sense, the fact that society approved of anything would be 

 recognised as the supreme sanction of it. Not only, however, 

 is this not so, not only do we judge as to whether society in 

 certain cases is right or wrong, but we demand a reason why 

 we should obey society at all ; we demand a rational basis 

 and justification for social claims, if we happen to have a 

 somewhat inquiring turn of mind. We shall be sure avowedly 

 or secretly to despise and neglect the performance of acts 

 which we do not happen to desire, and which have not an 

 intellectual sanction. 



The only passage in which our author seems as if about to 

 meet the real question at issue is very disappointing, as the 

 difficulty is merely evaded. He remarks : &quot; I am aware that 

 some persons maintain that actions performed impulsively do 

 not come under the dominion of the moral sense, and cannot 

 be called moral&quot; (vol. i. p. 87). This is not a correct state 

 ment of the intuitive view, and the difficulty is evaded thus : 

 &quot; But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear line of 

 distinction of this kind, though the distinction may be real !&quot; 

 It seems to us, however, that there is no difficulty at all in 

 drawing a line between a judgment as to an action being right 



* Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, edit. 1751, p. 132. 



