CHAP. V.] DUTY AND PLEASURE. 113 



might exercise his conscience in looking back and judging 

 with dissatisfaction that he had eaten the wrong sauce. 



Indeed, elsewhere (vol. i. p. 103) Mr. Darwin speaks of 

 &quot; the standard of morality rising higher and higher,&quot; though 

 he nowhere explains what he means either by the &quot;standard&quot; 

 or by the &quot; higher ;&quot; and, indeed, it is very difficult to under 

 stand what can possibly be meant by this &quot;rising of the 

 standard,&quot; if the &quot;standard&quot; is from first to last pleasure and 

 profit. 



About sympathy for suffering he says: &quot;Nor could we 

 check our sympathy, if so urged by hard reason, without 

 deterioration in the noblest part of our nature.&quot; But it may 

 well be asked, why and how noblest ? 



We find, again, the singular remark : &quot; If any desire or 

 instinct leading to an action opposed to the good of others, 

 still appears to a man, when recalled to mind, as strong as or 

 stronger than his social instinct, he will feel no keen regret 

 at having followed it&quot; (vol. i. p. 92). 



Of Indians, he says (vol. i. p. 99): &quot;It would be difficult 

 to distinguish between the remorse felt by a Hindoo who has 

 eaten unclean food, from that felt after committing a theft.&quot; 

 Very likely so, for it would be difficult to say which act would, 

 in him, be the more culpable. 



Mr. Darwin is continually mistaking a merely beneficial 

 action for a moral one ; but, as before said, it is one thing to 

 act well, and quite another to be a moral agent. A dog or 

 even a fruit-tree may act well, but neither is a moral ao-ent. 

 Of course, all the instances he brings forward with regard to 

 animals are not in point, on account of this misconception of 

 the problem to be solved. He gives, however, some examples 

 which tell strongly against his own view. Thus, he remarks 

 of the Law of Honour: &quot; The breach of this law, even when 

 the breach is known to be strictly accordant with true mo 

 rality, has caused many a man more agony than a real crime. 

 We recognise the same influence in the sense of burning 

 shame which most of us have felt, even after the interval of 

 years, when calling to mind some accidental breach of a 



i 



